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Abstract 
While much attention has been given to reputation mechanisms to deter fraudulent 
behavior in online auctions, we know little about the nature of disputes or the types of 
problems that users face. This is an exploratory analysis of 129 disputes for six different 
types of products that were sold on eBay. In the descriptive and multinomial analysis, we 
find eight different types of disputes including poor quality, slow shipping, seller 
withdrawal, failure to ship the product, fraud, poor communications, misunderstanding, 
and non-paying bidders. Of these the most common types of disputes were poor 
communications, non-paying bidders and item quality. In the most serious disputes of 
fraud and no shipment where the seller is at fault the reputation ratings are much lower 
than the ratings for other disputes related to sellers. Similarly for buyers, the reputation 
ratings for the most serious disputes of non-paying bidders are considerably lower than 
those of other types of disputes related to buyers. This implies that analysis of reputation 
ratings is of some value in reducing the probability of dispute. Of the types of payments 
methods in eBay auctions personal checks show the greatest number of disputes. Auction 
sites may wish to discourage sellers from accepting this type of payment. 
1 Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to understand the nature of disputes that occur in online 
transactions. While there have been other studies that have analyzed the importance of 
reputation mechanisms to deter the likelihood of inappropriate or fraudulent activities, 
there has been little analysis of the nature of disputes, which are an important factor in the 
success of an electronic marketplace. This is thus an exploratory study of online auctions 
to determine whether factors such as the number of bids, the reputation of the seller, the 
length of the auction, and the final price are more likely to lead to a particular type of 
dispute. 
There are different factors that can lead to a dispute. A dispute can occur in an online 
transaction when either the buyer or the seller is dissatisfied. There are several factors that 
can lead to a dispute. These are lack of or late payment, lack of or late product delivery, 
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poor quality, miscommunication, and misinterpretation of the terms of the exchange or 
the product. 
2 Causes Of Auction Disputes 
When people engage in transactions there is an expectation that they will benefit from the 
exchange and that the transaction will be smooth. Classic economic theory suggests that 
people enter into trades because the utility that they derive from what they are receiving 
exceeds that of what they are giving. Thus the sale of a good can allow a seller to acquire 
the means to maintain production and earn a profit. Similarly for a buyer the purchase of 
the good can enhance utility. It can for example increase his productivity or simply 
enhance other aspects of the person’s life. 
Most transactions are routine and do not result in problems. In a physical transaction, 
where both the buyer and the seller are present, the exchange of goods and payment take 
place simultaneously at the time of purchase. If there are any problems with quality or 
payment, they can be immediately resolved. The buyer in a physical trade has the 
opportunity of inspecting goods and deciding if they fulfill expectations. Similarly if the 
payment is incomplete or a credit card was not accepted, again the problem can be solved 
at that moment thus making the transaction satisfactory for both parties. 
There are several built in factors in a physical trade that make it less likely for a 
transaction to result in a dispute. The transaction is simultaneous; payment and receipt is 
done at the time of purchase; if there are any problems with the product the buyer can 
locate the seller and request repair or exchange; and transactions are often done at 
established retail stores that have a reputation to protect. 
Creative entrepreneurial initiatives, advances in technology and the desire to facilitate the 
exchange of goods and services led to the development of asynchronous transactions in 
the form of catalogs, for example, and recently virtual marketplaces. Transactions in these 
environments have inherently greater risks and the likelihood that a trade will result in a 
dispute is thus increased. 
There are several factors that make an asynchronous online transaction more prone to 
disputes. First, asynchronous transactions are inherently riskier than a simultaneous trade. 
The buyer finds a product that he desires or needs, orders it, pays for it, and waits for 
delivery. Asynchronous transactions have existed for a long time. These were done 
primarily through catalogs. Purchases of this type were less problematic than many of 
their online equivalents. Companies that sell products through catalogs are frequently 
established retailers that have invested time and resources in developing a brand and 
maintaining the loyalty of their customers. They know that through positive transactions 
customers will continue to purchase with the company. In an online environment 
transactions can take place not only between consumers and businesses but also among 
individuals. In this environment, an asynchronous transaction entails greater risk than a 
catalog would. The investment necessary to set up a retail outlet on the Internet is much 
smaller than the investment for paper catalogs. This has resulted in the emergence of 
many micro enterprises that allow individuals to sell things. On eBay, for example, there 
are millions of individuals selling products and services. There are also countless 
numbers of micro retailers who are unknown to buyers. The existence of this type of 
sellers can potentially result in a market of lemons where low quality goods are 
exchanged in most transactions (e.g. Akerlof, 1970). 
While there have been markets where individuals sold products and services to other 
individuals these were done through physical exchanges in the form of garage sales or 
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flee markets. The physical presence of the buyer and seller reduced the likelihood of 
disputes. 
In this study we analyze Internet auctions, specifically eBay. The reason why we choose 
auctions is because these are, according to the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, the area 
where the greatest volume of fraudulent activity on the Internet occurs. We also 
emphasize consumer-to-consumer transactions because this type of transaction poses the 
greatest difficulties and is also relevant to emerging transactions in peer-to-peer and other 
Internet communities.  
The different types of disputes that can emerge from an online transaction differ in 
severity. A misunderstanding or slow payment or delivery is less serious than failing to 
pay or send the product. Table 1 presents the different types of disputes represented in the 
sample of auctions in this study. The table is organized from the least to the most severe 
type of dispute. 
 
Table 1: Types Of Disputes In Ebay Auctions 
Type of dispute Example 
Quality “Received my money promptly, delivery of item weeks later, item in need of 
repair” 
Slow shipping “Took over a month to send item; but once contacted, very helpful.” 
Seller withdrawal “Won bid, paid, and had to wait 3 weeks for seller to say ‘sorry, no sale’” 
Failed to ship “I never received my purchase from this person” 
Fraud “BEWARE: no contact since payment, no response to emails, phone 
disconnected” 
Poor communication “Never paid. Ignored multiple emails. Tried to contact - wrong #. Beware!” 
Misunderstanding “Refused to pay by cashiers check/money order as auction terms required” 
NPB (non-paying bidder) “Placed the Bid, closed auction and after started to research what he 
bought.” 
 
3 Literature Review 
In this study we used as dependent variables the types of dispute that are listed in Table 1. 
To our knowledge there have not been any academic studies that help us understand the 
nature of disputes. The few studies related to this issue include reports prepared by the 
National Consumers League (http://www.fraud.org/welcome.htm) and by the FBI Internet 
Fraud Complaint Center (http://www.ifccfbi.gov/index.asp). Both of these reports find 
that auctions are the largest source of Internet fraud, with 46% of complaints. Other 
causes of Internet fraud include non-delivery of merchandise with 31% of the complaints 
(http://www.ifccfbi.gov/strategy/2002_IFCCReport.pdf). Beyond these statistics there is 
little information about the factors that lead to these types of disputes. This study thus is 
an attempt to fill this gap. 
In the analysis of disputes we find that miscommunication, lack of payment, and poor 
quality are the three most common sources of disputes. Previous work on electronic 
commerce trust and reputation has shown that interaction with people in real time 
increases the level of trust when conducting electronic transactions (Basso, Goldberg, 
Greenspan, and Weimer, 2001). Trust develops over time as people interact with one 
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another and incrementally develop trust (Meyerson et al., 1996). In a physical interaction, 
Ekman and Friesen (1974) find that facial expressions help individuals form either trust 
or deceptive impressions. E-mail, which is the most common means of communication 
among individuals participating in online auctions, lacks these facial and body cues. 
Unfortunately there is no available record of the level of communication that individuals 
have after auctions have been finalized and the only thing that we know is whether or not 
they were a satisfied with the transaction and if poor communication was a factor. 
While failure to pay after a transaction is not fraud because the merchandise has not been 
shipped, it nonetheless disrupts the market. Although auction fees are reimbursed to the 
seller, it is nonetheless time consuming to arrange this and relist the item. In spite of the 
fact that much research has been done about auctions, we do not know what prompts 
people to not finalize the transaction after winning the auction. We can speculate that the 
buyer later realized that the bid was too high. 
There are a number of independent variables that we include in this study to determine 
the factors that lead to different types of disputes. These are: seller experience, reputation, 
product type, item quality, information provided about the item, payment mechanism, 
price, length of the auction, and number of bids. 
 
3.1 Reputation And Disputes 
Because individuals are unable to form long term relationships and because it is not 
possible to develop impressions from physical and facial cues, online auction sites have 
developed ratings as a substitute for physical interactions. Studies on reputation have 
shown that an individual’s reputation encourages others to engage in trade (Andrianova, 
2000). We know that reputation mechanisms have been implemented to alleviate the 
information asymmetries that are prevalent in electronic transactions. Reputation ratings 
are imperfect. A paper by Resnick and Zeckhauser (2001) finds that ratings are used as a 
means to reciprocate and retaliate. Individuals can also create new identities and eliminate 
bad ratings from their history (Friedman and Resnick, 1999). It is possible as well for 
people to conspire against a seller or a buyer and intentionally give negative ratings 
(Dellarocas, 2000).  
H1: The lower the ratings of the seller the higher the likelihood of disputes related to non-
delivery, poor quality, and seller withdrawal. 
H2: The lower the reputation of buyers the higher the probability of non-paying bidders. 
 
3.2 Product Type And Quality 
There are some products that are inherently more difficult to buy than others. The 
purchase of groceries, for example, involves a decision making process that is almost 
automated, where the buyer does not need to make complex comparisons, and disposable 
income is almost the only variable of relevance (Kinsey 1997). This contrasts with the 
purchase of an automobile or a house, which requires much more research and knowledge 
of the product and the seller. In between these two extremes lay a number of other 
products for which people have developed certain criteria to help them decide what to 
buy. In clothing for example young females consider fit, look, and style as important 
factors in their purchase decisions (Taylor, Cosenza, 2002). While things like fit are 
important to people in the consumption of clothing, for example, it is quite surprising to 
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find that apparel is one of the most purchased goods on the Internet (Research Alert, 
2002). It is even more surprising to note the large number of used cars purchased over the 
Internet. There are several factors that online sites are incorporating into their sites to 
make the individual more comfortable with a purchase. 
H3: The more complex the criteria used in evaluating the good the greater the likelihood 
of dispute. 
 
3.3 Payment Methods And Disputes 
The trade press reported that there are approximately 27 billion credit card transactions 
every year (Caunter, 2001). In 2001 2% of these were from transactions were conducted 
over the Internet. Fraud from electronic commerce transactions is 10 to 20 times more 
likely than fraud in face to face interactions, and some of research report that E-
commerce fraud it is 5 to 10% higher (Caunter, 2001). Credit card fraud happens 
frequently. Credit card companies have developed sophisticated systems that help them 
detect unusual behavior and stops authorization in cases that could be fraudulent. Perhaps 
similar systems will be implemented in online transactions. 
Studies that have looked at the issue of payments for transactions on the Internet have 
examined the development of secure systems, the factors that affect the adoption of 
electronic payments, and the potential for government regulation of electronic banking. 
The systems literature has worked on the development of protocols and algorithms that 
will make transactions more secure, or to ensure that personal information is not released 
when a payment is made over the Internet, or to preserve the anonymity of traders. 
(Hwang J, Yeh T. and Li J, 2003; Alexandris N. et al. 2000; Camp et al. 1996; Brickell, 
Gemmell and Kravitz 1995;). Scholars in this field have also tried to develop mechanisms 
that will assure payment (Schuldt H. Popovici A, and Schek H., 2000). While these 
efforts are important to limit breaches in the system we need to understand the behavior 
of the users in these online environments to be able to develop solutions.  
Because of the growing number of transactions taking place over the Internet, there have 
been great advances in security of online payments. The problem is not of systems that 
fail or that are hacked but with the simpler problem that emerges when two individuals 
participating in a transactions agree to a transaction but in the end one of the parties 
decides not to fulfill its part of the agreement. Secure systems are not able to resolve this 
type of behavioral problem.  
In online auctions individuals accept multiple types of payments such as credit cards, 
cashiers checks, personal checks, and PayPal. Because of the automation that has been 
achieved with electronic payments, we suspect that credit cards and PayPal payments are 
the least likely of these to lead to disputes while cashiers and personal checks, which have 
time delay, are more likely to have problems. 
H4: Electronic payments have a lower probability of dispute compared to non-electronic 
payments. 
 
3.4 Prices And Disputes 
Much research has been done about auctions and prices. Recent studies have analyzed the 
strategies that sellers and buyers use for online auctions. We are not aware of studies that 
have looked at the relationship between prices and types of disputes. There is nonetheless 
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evidence from existing research that both buyers and sellers strategically participate in 
these auctions and one could argue that some strategies may lead to disputes. Studies 
about bidding behavior have shown, for example, that sellers can maximize their 
revenues by manipulating things such as minimum bids, opening price, and reserve 
prices. Katkar and Lucking-Reiley (2000) find that secret reserve prices deter bidders and 
ultimately lead to a lower price. Similarly Lucking-Reiley et al. (1998) find that increases 
in minimum bids result in reduced numbers of bidders but, according to Haney (2001), 
increasing the bid increment can result in higher revenue as well. Bajari and Hortacsu 
(2003) find evidence of the winners’ curse in their empirical analysis of eBay auctions. 
Sellers can also selectively close an auction after a particular bid has been received 
(Stubblebine and Syverson, 1999). Sellers can manipulate bidding requirements and there 
is also evidence that some of them contact the highest bidder to offer them a price. If the 
bidder accepts the transaction they can avoid paying the commission to eBay (Katkar and 
Lucking, 2000). Strategies in auctions are not unique to sellers. Buyers can also contact 
the seller and bid strategically. However, prices, as stated by Morris and Maes, are over-
emphasized in auctions and they become the only criteria for matching buyers and sellers. 
This criterion can leave some buyers unsatisfied with their purchases. Some of the 
variables that buyers and sellers can manipulate can have an impact on the probability of 
disputes.  
H5: The fewer the number of bids and the shorter the length of the auction the greater the 
number of disputes related to price. 
4 Methods 
In this paper we use multinomial logit (MNL) to determine the factors that are more 
likely to result in a certain type of dispute. MNL has been used in disciplines such as 
marketing to determine the factors that lead to a given selection among many options. In 
the case of online transactions, disputes occur as a result of buyer and seller choices. We 
will thus construct two models, one in which we analyze the factors that lead to disputes 
when the person primarily at fault was the seller, and another when the person primarily 
at fault was the buyer. 
MNL analysis has three elements in the model: a) the decision makers; b) the alternatives; 
and c) the attributes of the alternatives. 
The decision maker. In this analysis there are two decision makers, the buyer and the 
seller, which will thus lead us to fit two models, one for each. Data about the decisions 
makers in this study corresponds to their experience in conducting eBay transactions and 
their reputation rating. 
The alternatives. In any given transaction sellers decide whether or not to provide 
accurate information regarding the quality of the product, to send the product quickly, or 
to not send it at all. A person may refuse to sell after she said she would or she may not 
communicate promptly and clearly. Similarly the buyer can decide to send the payment 
promptly, slowly, or not at all. He may also not communicate adequately. 
The attributes. The specific attributes for each of the alternatives can be the result of 
several factors such as the price of the product, the quality, the amount of time that the 
product was auctioned, the number of bids received, and the type of payment. A seller 
may decide not to sell if she believes that the auction was too short or that the price was 
too low. Similarly the buyer may change his mind and decide not to pay if the price 
seems too high.  
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The data analyzed in this paper comes for a sample of eBay.com auctions that resulted in 
disputes. The sample corresponds to 129 transactions in six different product categories. 
The data was compiled using a PERL program developed by the authors that extracted 
the data from over 17,000 auctions into a database in two passes over a three week period 
in May and June 2003. The data required substantial cleaning. Many of the auctions did 
not result in transactions. Table 2 describes the data used in the statistical analysis. 
 
Table 2: Data Description 
Variable name Description Code 
Product Data on 6 item types 1=Vacation package 
2=Sony camcorder  
3=Electronic keyboard  
4=Card game  
5=Cutter  
6=Drill 
Reputation Reputation in eBay is represented by the seller 
and buyer ratings. The higher the number the 
better the reputation 
Integer number 
Experience Experience was constructed from the addition of 
positive, neutral and negative ratings for sellers 
and buyers. A higher number indicates greater 
experience. 
Integer number 
Quality The physical products were subcategorized in 
new and used. A used product is expected to 
have lower quality than a new product. 
Dummy variables: new, used 
Communication Because it is impossible to determine if 
communication took place between the buyer 
and seller before the auction took place we can 
only use a proxy. In this case the seller 
communicates with the buyer through the length 
of the description posted in the auction offer 
Content size (in Kbytes) of the 
file of the auction 
Payment 
mechanisms 
Some payment methods may be more prone to 
disputes than others so we created different 
categories of payments accepted in any given bid 
Dummy variables: credit card, 
PayPal cashiers check 
Price difference Difference between the starting and final price of 
the auction 
Amount 
Tangibility Physical goods are tangible while services and 
digital items are intangible. 
Dummy variables: physical, non-
physical 
Number of bids The total number of bids for the entire auction Integer 
Length of auction Number of hours that the auction was active Integer 
Final price The selling price of the item Amount 
 
5 Descriptive Statistics 
In this section we present some summary statistics of the variables of interests that may 
provide some insights into the problem of disputes and their causes. Table 3 presents the 
number of disputes by type of dispute and by product. It shows that physical products 
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rather than services tend to have a greater number of disputes, as are consumer related 
items as opposed to business ones such as welders and cutters. The table also shows that 
that most prevalent type of dispute is related to communication. Buyers and sellers are 
dissatisfied with a transaction because of the difficulties that they have communicating. 
Non-paying bidders and quality of the product are the second and third most prevalent 
type of disputes. 
 
Table 3: Disputes By Type And By Product 
 
Dispute 
type/Product 
Vacation 
package 
Sony 
camcorder 
Electronic 
keyboard 
Card game Cutter Total 
Quality 0 6 8 4 0 18 
Slow shipping 0 0 1 7 1 9 
Seller withdrawal 0 2 7 2 0 11 
Failed to ship 0 0 5 6 0 11 
Fraud 0 9 1 0 0 10 
Poor 
communication 
3 7 12 16 1 39 
Misunderstanding 0 1 1 2 0 4 
NPB (Non-paying 
bidder) 
11 3 11 2 0 27 
Total 14 28 46 39 2 129 
Pearson chi2(28) = 91.4623 Pr = 0.000 
 
Since we are concerned with the type of factors that lead to certain disputes we present 
first the attributes of the decision makers. This will help us determine whether buyer, 
sellers, their reputation, or experience lead to certain types of dispute. 
Table 4 indicates who was largely responsible for the dispute. Thus disputes related to 
quality, slow shipping, seller withdrawal, and failure to ship are normally associated with 
the seller. The buyer most often causes disputes relating to non-paying bidders, poor 
communication, and misunderstanding. Many disputes result from the misinterpretation 
of the information that the seller provides. This sample shows that the greatest loss, such 
as through fraud, is born by the buyer. The experience and reputation ratings for the most 
serious disputes such as failure to ship, fraud, and non-paying bidders have substantially 
lower reputation ratings compared to the less serious dispute types. 
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Table 4: Summary Statistics Related To The Decision Makers And The Relationship With 
The Type Of Disputes - Mean (Standard Deviation) 
 Quality Slow shipping 
Seller 
withdrawal 
Failed 
to ship Fraud 
Poor 
commu- 
nication 
Misunder-
standing NPB 
Seller 
Fault 
80.56 
(12.59) 
71.11 
(25.71) 
88.18 
(14.01) 
99.09 
(3.02) 
100 
(0) 
19.23 
(31.90) 
32.5 
(22.17) 
0 
(0) 
Buyer 
Fault 
5 
(14.65) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
76.92 
(36.06) 
60 
(8.16) 
100 
(0) 
No 
Blame 
14.44 
(9.84) 
28.89 
(25.71) 
11.82 
(14.01) 
0.91 
(3.02) 
0 
(0) 
3.85 
(9.63) 
7.5 
(15) 
0 
(0) 
Seller 
Experience 
107.94 
(140.86) 
120.78 
(237.99) 
132.81 
(320.63) 
49.18 
(69.05) 
97.4 
(33.52) 
298.82 
(523.95) 
147 
(119.51) 
896 
(1381.65) 
Buyer 
Experience 
29.11 
(41.63) 
18.56 
(29.81) 
18 
(21.89) 
30.18 
(60.17) 
14.4 
(16.81) 
42.51 
(195.40) 
15.25 
(10.31) 
5.04 
(6.94) 
Seller 
Rating 
105.11 
(139.95) 
117.44 
(231.41) 
114.18 
(268.17) 
45.82 
(64.22) 
88 
(31.62) 
281.82 
(506.11) 
142.75 
(116.03) 
855.22 
(1349.88) 
Buyer 
Rating 
28.39 
(40.37) 
18.22 
(29.52) 
15.64 
(19.81) 
29.73 
(59.05) 
14.2 
(16.41) 
41.33 
(195.57) 
13.75 
(10.46) 
3.67 
(6.73) 
 
Quality is another factor that leads to disputes. Because it is often difficult to determine 
the quality of a product based on the description provided by the seller, we can only 
differentiate quality in three attributes: 1) whether or not the product is new or used, 2) 
whether the product is tangible or not; and 3) the size of the file that contains the product 
description. 
We expect that used products will have more quality related disputes because the 
condition of the product is difficult to assess from a description or a picture. The buyer, 
who is unable to inspect the merchandise, thus bears a greater risk. We also expect that a 
tangible product will have greater quality related disputes than a virtual product because 
they experience wear and tear. We expect that smaller file sizes for descriptions will lead 
to greater quality related disputes because there is less information available to assess. 
 
Table 5: Percentages Of Disputes With Respect To Used And New Goods 
Dispute Type Used New Total 
Quality 13 1 14 
Slow shipping 2 0 2 
Seller withdrawal 7 2 9 
Failed to ship 5 0 5 
Fraud 1 9 10 
Poor communication 16 3 19 
Misunderstanding 1 1 2 
NPB (Non-paying bidder) 13 0 13 
Total 58 16 74 
Pearson chi2(7) = 36.1729 Pr = 0.000 
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Table 6: Type Of Disputes By Item Tangibility 
 
PriDispute Intangible Tangible Total 
Quality 0 4 4 
Slow shipping 0 7 7 
Seller withdrawal 0 2 2 
Failed to ship 2 4 6 
Fraud 0 0 0 
Poor communication 4 15 19 
Misunderstanding 0 2 2 
NPB (Non-paying bidder) 12 1 13 
Total 18 35 53 
Pearson chi2(6) = 28.8591 Pr = 0.000 
 
The final variable that we used as a proxy for quality is the size of the file that the seller 
uploaded to describe the roduct or service that he was offering for sale. In this case we are 
concerned about disputes related to quality, poor communication, and misunderstanding 
and we want to determine if those types of disputes have descriptions that are shorter than 
the descriptions provided on the transactions that had a different type of dispute. Table 7 
shows the summary statistics of the content size of the files by type of dispute. The 
average content size for all disputes is 44,026 kilobytes and the content size for quality, 
communication, and misunderstanding does not appear to be smaller than any of the 
others. This indicates that it is not the lack of information provided about the product or 
service that is leading to disputes but more the actual content of the description. 
 
Table 7: Summary Statistics For Content Size By Type Of Dispute - Mean (Standard 
Deviation) 
 
 Quality Slow shipping 
Seller 
withdrawal 
Failed 
to ship Fraud 
Poor 
commu-
nication 
Misunder-
standing NPB 
Content 
size 
41161 
(6786) 
35521 
(2569) 
41136 
(7091) 
35229 
(3139) 
38395 
(1740) 
45671 
(10252) 
39201 
(3091) 
53959 
(14588) 
No. Obs. = 18 
 
The type of payment is another element that can result in disputes. An eBay seller can 
determine the payment mechanism that they accept to complete the transaction. There are 
some sellers that only accept one type of payment such as PayPal, credit card, or cashier 
checks. Other sellers allow more than one mechanism. PayPal and credit cards involve 
instant payment while personal and cashier’s check have a time gap between the 
termination of the auction and receipt of payment. Table 8 presents the percentage of 
disputes for each payment method. Only four types of disputes were included in these 
tables because they are the ones most likely to have occurred as a result of payment 
problems. The table includes four types of payments. PayPal only, PayPal and credit card 
only, cashiers check only, and personal check. It is clear from the tables that fewer 
disputes were related to the use of cashier’s checks, PayPal only, and PayPal and credit 
card only options. Transactions that accepted all types of checks have the greatest number 
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of disputes and since cashier’s check have fewer disputes it is clear that personal checks 
cause the greatest number of disputes. 
Regarding the type of dispute associated with a type of payment, we find that with the 
exception of fraud, there was no substantial difference. The table shows that, in general, 
payments done through PayPal resulted in fewer disputes but in the case of a fraud related 
dispute, the payment method used was PayPal. This is a surprising result that requires 
further investigation. 
 
Table 8: Percentage Of Disputes For Each Payment Method 
 
 
Quality Slow shipping 
Seller 
withdrawal 
Failed 
to ship Fraud 
Poor 
commu-
nication 
Misunder-
standing NPB 
Pearson 
Chi2 
(Pr) 
PayPal 
Only 19.23% 0% 7.69% 7.69% 34.62% 19.23% 0% 11.54% 
35.04 
(0.0) 
Personal 
Checks 
Accepted 
13.27% 8.16% 8.16% 9.18% 1.02% 33.67% 4.08% 22.45% 12.26 (0.09) 
PayPal/ 
Credit 
Card 
Only 
18.52% 0.0% 7.41% 7.41% 33.33% 18.52% 0.0% 14.81% 36.97 (0.0) 
Cashier’s 
Checks 
Only 
10.53% 0.0% 21.05% 15.79% 5.26% 21.05% 10.53% 15.79% 36.97 (0.0) 
 
Some sellers may decide not to ship the product if they are unsatisfied with the final 
price. Similarly a buyer may become a non-paying bidder if he realizes that he overpaid. 
Some auctions result in the winner’s curse phenomenon and these may occasionally result 
in non-paying bidders. Table 9 presents the summary statistics by type of dispute for 
these factors. With the exception of the fraud category, which requires further inspection, 
the price differences between the starting and selling price do not seem to result in a 
higher number of non paying bidders. 
Table 9 also shows summary statistics by type of disputes and hours of auctions. Most 
sellers on eBay choose a three, seven, or ten day auction. eBay charges an additional fee 
for longer auctions. The table shows that the length of auction does not affect the type of 
dispute. 
 
Table 9: Percentage Summary Statistics By Type Of Dispute 
 Quality Slow shipping 
Seller 
withdrawal 
Failed 
to ship Fraud 
Poor 
commu-
nication 
Misunder-
standing NPB 
Price 
difference 
0.61 
(0.41) 
0.62 
(0.40) 
0.44 
(0.37) 
0.43 
(0.44) 
0.06 
(0.19) 
0.41 
(0.40) 
0.64 
(0.41) 
0.57 
(0.37) 
Number of 
bids 
9.72 
(15.02) 
4.22 
(4.97) 
12 
(9.5) 
8.18 
(5.64) 
21.3 
(5.46) 
7 
(6.04) 
6 
(4.08) 
7.60 
(6.42) 
Length of 
auction 
116 
(57) 
112 
(63) 
142 
(39) 
82 
(53) 
72 
(0) 
128 
(49) 
151 
(90) 
137 
(66) 
No. Of 
Obs. 
18 9 11 11 10 39 4 27 
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6 Statistical Analysis 
Because in a multinomial logit we are representing decisions, we need to separate the 
decisions that are made by the buyer from the decisions that are made by the seller. Once 
this is done then we can fit the multinomial logit for each of the two parties. 
Table 10 presents the results of multinomial logit analysis. This is an initial attempt to 
understand the nature of disputes in online auctions but it should be understood that the 
limited number of disputes combined with multiple options and variables included in the 
model limits the statistical results. Thus only general conclusions can be drawn from this 
analysis. 
First, we notice that the most common type of disputes that result from buyers related 
disputes are poor communication and non-paying bidders. We also note that poor 
communication related disputes are independent of the product while non-paying bidders 
seem to be more associated with consumer related products and less with business related 
products. In both types of disputes the rating of the buyer was relevant. For a dispute 
regarding poor communication we would have expected that the buyer rating would be 
the relevant variable and the other would not be relevant. In this case the other variables 
are also significant, but from the limited amount of information that is available about the 
type of communications that seller and buyer have after an auction has been won, it is 
difficult to determine why these variables have an effect on this type of dispute. 
Regarding non-paying bidders we suspected that the buyer ratings, the sell price 
difference between the minimum bid and the winning bid, as well as the number of bids 
could be a factor that could have motivated a buyer to not pay after winning an auction. 
Here we find that the rating is relevant but the price difference or number of bids is not. 
 
Table 10: Multinomal Logit Results For Buyers By Type Of Dispute 
 Poor communication Misunder-standing NPB 
Buyer rating 0.82 (0.04) 
1.19 
(0.55) 
0.75 
(0.01) 
Content size 1.00 (0.00) 
1.00 
(0.94) 
1.00 
(0.01) 
Price difference 0.02 (0.01) 
38.42 
(0.34) 
1.24 
(0.91) 
Length of auction 1.01 (0.01) 
1.02 
(0.53) 
1.02 
(0.00) 
Number of bids 0.32 (0.01) 
2.17 
(0.53) 
0.86 
(0.78) 
Camcorder 6.88e-08 (0.00) 
0.28 
(0.88) 
1.78e-09 
(0.00) 
Keyboard 1.85e-07 (0.00) 
0.16 
(0.82) 
5.88e-09 
(0.00) 
Card game 3.01e-07 (0.00) 
1.66 
(0.94) 
3.47e-09 
(0.00) 
Cutter 6.14e-08 (0.00) 
1.84e-15 
(1.00) 
1.56e-23 
(1.00) 
Number of observations = 129 
Pseudo R2 = 0.32 
Relative risk ratios – RRR (z-tests significance level) 
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Table 11 presents the probabilities for each of the products by type of dispute. We can see 
that for the products included in the model, poor communications is the type of dispute 
that has the highest probability of occurring, while misunderstandings are the type of 
disputes that have the lowest probability. Non-paying bidders fall in the middle, and the 
keyboard and camcorder are more likely to experience this than the card game, which is 
also available in a digital format, and the drill. 
 
Table 11: Probability Of Buyer-Related Dispute By Type And Product 
 Poor commu-
nication 
Misunder-standing NPB Buyer not at 
fault 
Camcorder 0.25 0.01 0.08 0.65 
Keyboard 0.42 0.00 0.17 0.40 
Card game 0.56 0.04 0.08 0.32 
Cutter 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.74 
 
Table 12 shows the results of the multinomial logit analysis for sellers. There are more 
types of disputes that can emerge related to the conduct of the seller. The types of 
disputes that were identified were quality problems, slow shipping, failure to ship, fraud, 
poor communication, and misunderstanding. Because of the low number of disputes and 
the high number of choices, it was not possible to fit a model that included all of these 
alternatives. We thus needed to collapse them into three categories. Quality and slow 
shipping were combined. We consider that slow shipping is an element of quality. 
Similarly fraud and failing to ship were combined. In this case fraud was a code given to 
disputes that showed intent to deceive the buyer while failing to ship could potentially be 
attributed to lost mail. Poor communication and misunderstanding were also combined 
due to their similarity. Table 12 presents the results of this multinomial analysis. As in the 
model that was fit for buyers, we also present these results with the caveat that the small 
sample and the complexity of the interactions that are modeled with this analysis does not 
allow for minute interpretation of the results. Only general patterns can be inferred. For 
disputes related to quality we find that the rating of the seller, the content size, and the 
number of hours that an auction is up have an effect on the type of dispute. To a certain 
extent we can see how the reputation of the seller can determine whether or not the 
quality is high. We can also see how the content of the product in the auction can 
potentially lead to sellers providing information that is not quite accurate. We do not have 
an explanation for the number of hours. 
For disputes related to failure of shipment we see that all of the coefficients are 
significant with the exception of the payment mechanism. This is expected because a 
failure to ship dispute can only happen when payment was made so the type of payment 
should not have any impact on the likelihood of this type of dispute happening. A seller 
may also be dissatisfied with the price obtained. The price may have also been related to 
the number of hours that the auction was opened. As expected these two variables are 
significant. We also note that the failure to ship happens to all types of products.  
Disputes related to poor communication and misunderstanding are not explained by 
almost any of the factors included in the model. This to a certain extent is expected as 
communication outside of the auction environment is related to factors that cannot be 
captured by the information displayed at the auction site. Collectible cards seem to be 
most affected by this type of dispute. 
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Table 12: Multinomal Logit Results For Sellers By Type Of Dispute 
 Quality Failed to ship Poor Communication 
Seller rating 0.74 
(0.06) 
0.63 
(0.00) 
0.80 
(0.15) 
Content size 1.00 
(0.00) 
1.00 
(0.00) 
1.00 
(0.67) 
Length of auction 0.98 
(0.02) 
0.98 
(0.01) 
0.99 
(0.09) 
Price difference 1.43 
(0.75) 
0.13 
(0.08) 
0.25 
(0.14) 
PayPal and credit card only 0.58 
(0.58) 
0.90 
(0.92) 
0.23 
(0.11) 
Camcorder 2.21 
(0.58) 
3.44e+08 
(0.00) 
5.55 
(0.13) 
Keyboard 0.22 
(0.31) 
4.61e+07 
(0.00) 
2.24 
(0.50) 
Card game 1.38 
(0.85) 
7.14e+07 
(0.00) 
17.61 
(0.04) 
Number of observations = 129 
Pseudo R2 = 0.28 
Relative risk ratios – RRR (z-tests significance level) 
 
Table 13 once again presents the probability of dispute by type for the products. It shows 
that camcorders are more likely to experience problems related to quality. Keyboards and 
game cards are more likely to experience non-shipment disputes. In general non-shipment 
is the dispute that is more likely to occur. 
 
Table 13: Probability Of Seller-Related Dispute By Type And Product 
 Quality Failed to ship Poor communication Seller not at fault 
Camcorder 0.36 0.14 0.18 0.58 
Keyboard 0.28 0.16 0.05 0.00 
Card game 0.29 0.45 0.72 0.18 
Cutter 0.07 0.25 0.05 0.23 
 
17 Conclusion 
While much attention has been given to reputation mechanisms to deter fraudulent 
behavior in online auctions, we know little about the nature of disputes or the types of 
problems that people who engage in those transactions most commonly face.  
In this study we presented an exploratory analysis of disputes for six different types of 
products. In our analysis of descriptive and multinomial logit statistics of the disputes, we 
found eight different types of dispute including poor quality, slow shipping, seller 
withdrawal, failure to ship the product, fraud, poor communication, misunderstanding, 
and non-paying bidders. Of these, the most common types were poor communication, 
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non-paying bidders, and quality. It is not surprising that online transactions experience 
these types of disputes as the parties involved cannot inspect the product, do not have 
direct communication, and may not pay because the relationship is quasi-anonymous. Of 
all of the types of payments that are accepted in eBay auctions personal checks show the 
greatest frequency of disputes. This suggests that auction sites may want to discourage 
sellers from offering this type of payment. 
We found that in the most serious disputes involving fraud and no shipment, where the 
seller is at fault, the reputation ratings are much lower than the ratings for other types of 
disputes related to sellers. Similarly for buyers we find that the reputation ratings for the 
most common dispute, the non-paying bidder, are considerably lower than those of other 
types of disputes related to buyers. Thus, the most serious disputes such as failure to ship, 
fraud, and non-paying bidders, have substantially lower reputation ratings compared to 
the less serious dispute types. We thus conclude that reputation ratings are a useful 
predictor of fraud potential. 
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